"This article was originally published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies."

By: Samira Rafaela and Kelly Fay Rodríguez

Forced labor is pervasive in the global economy. In 2022, more than 17.3 million people were exploited by forced labor in the private sector worldwide, and another 3.9 million people were subjected to state-imposed forced labor. As the United States escalates global trade pressure over forced labor, Europe’s Forced Labor Regulation (FLR), which entered into force on December 14, 2024, faces a critical test: Will the new regulation achieve its ambition or fall short in practice?

Fully applicable to EU member states in December 2027, the FLR will prohibit the sale of products made with forced labor on the EU market. In doing so, the EU joins the United States in restricting trade linked to forced labor—an approach the U.S. has enshrined in law since the Tariff Act of 1930.

Yet it was not until the last decade that the U.S. government began to finally enforce preexisting legislation, along with new legislative and executive measures. Since the passage of the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), U.S. authorities have detained nearly $3.9 billion in goods made with forced labor. Importantly, the UFLPA shifted the burden of proof onto importers seeking to bring goods made with inputs from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or from designated entities into the U.S. market. That region is where Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subjected to state-imposed forced labor, which has been described by both President Trump and President Biden as a genocide.

Given the scale and systemic nature of forced labor in global supply chains, the European Union and United States—alongside firms and worker organizations—must take coordinated, strategic action to eliminate the risk of forced labor for workers. At the root of the problem is a structural imbalance: Multinational buyers often demand low prices and fast production, pushing risk and cost onto suppliers—and ultimately onto workers. Shein’s fast fashion is just one clear example of this dynamic, where the company’s timely and strenuous demands on production practically ensures forced labor occurs in the manufacturing of their goods.

The new European FLR is product-based and focuses exclusively on preventing goods produced—in whole or in part—under forced labor conditions from entering into, circulating within, or being exported from the EU market. All companies—irrespective of size, revenue, or location—will be subject to this regulation. Companies must prepare immediately and develop meaningful and proactive due diligence processes and remediation efforts. This must include taking affirmative steps to safeguard freedom of association and labor rights, and engaging trade unions early to ensure effective remediation.

The FLR also has an underappreciated strength: It creates a single, European Union–wide market access rule that can reduce fragmentation across member states and increase leverage with global suppliers. By applying at the border and within the internal market—and by covering exports as well as imports—it can help prevent the rerouting of tainted goods and give companies a clear compliance signal to invest in traceability, supplier engagement, and remediation before enforcement actions begin.

More robust and effective corporate human rights due diligence will help ensure EU FLR enforcement and impact by mitigating existing incentives to resort to forced labor in supply chains. For that reason, effective implementation of the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive will also be critical to reinforce the FLR’s impact and focus. If more companies enact effective and comprehensive human rights due diligence in global supply chains, then EU FLR implementing authorities may better prioritize the more reticent or resistant cases where forced labor persists. Indeed, the urgency and widespread scale of forced labor requires action by public and private sector actors alike.

The most significant difference between the EU and U.S. approaches lies in enforcement—and this is where the European Union risks falling short. In the United States, if a petitioner provides evidence amounting to a “reasonable suspicion” that goods were produced through forced labor, it can trigger an investigation by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Upon concluding the investigation, CBP may issue a Withhold Release Order, blocking or detaining the goods at any port of entry until the importer can demonstrate that no forced labor was involved in production. The process, therefore, places the evidentiary burden on the party best positioned to access supply-chain information. In contrast, the European Union requires “substantiated concerns” to initiate an investigation and places the burden on petitioners—primarily civil society advocates—and competent authorities to establish that a good was made with forced labor. This higher threshold may constrain the FLR’s effectiveness, particularly where documentation is scarce and supply chains are complex.

Another significant difference between the two approaches relates to state-imposed forced labor. Unlike the U.S. UFLPA, the EU FLR does not create a rebuttable presumption of forced labor for goods from regions associated with state-imposed forced labor, which is a key element of the UFLPA. Instead, the regulation provides for the creation of a database of high-risk areas and products—an important tool, but not a substitute for a presumption when state coercion makes verification exceptionally difficult.

Over the last decade, U.S. trade policy has substantially increased its prioritization of labor issues compared to past trade practices. U.S.-based labor stakeholders have advocated for prior administrations to leverage more effective economic tools to incentivize respect for labor rights and deter abuses, such as violence against workers, union-busting, and forced labor. Last month, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published a report on investigations into over 60 of the United States’ largest trading partners—including the European Union, China, Canada, Mexico, India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia—determining that all countries failed to impose or effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods produced with forced labor, which constitutes an unreasonable or discriminatory trade practice that burdens U.S. commerce. While some countries have begun to take steps, USTR has received numerous recommendations to improve implementation and enforcement from stakeholders, including academics, practitioners, and advocates.

The effectiveness of this effort is questionable and the motivations behind the action appear pretextual, because the White House is looking to replace the tariffs that were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court and such forced labor enforcement could be a more legally persuasive justification. In addition, other actions by the administration eliminated federal capacity and proven efforts to combat forced labor, such as canceling over $700,000 in global labor rights grants addressing forced labor overseas in 2025. Nevertheless, these investigations mark the most expansive use of trade law by any country to address labor abuses to date.

Neither the United States nor the European Union adequately centers workers or guarantees meaningful remedies for survivors, though the United States has ensured compensation for survivors in discrete cases. Further, neither model centers on worker organizations or trade unions throughout the process. Meaningful engagement with workers and unions is necessary to ensure respect for labor rights and secure justice for harm suffered.

Robust government enforcement of all these measures is critical. Labor nongovernmental organizations and trade unions play a critical role in effective enforcement, particularly in workplaces governed by collective bargaining agreements or international framework agreements. Independent and democratic labor unions reduce the risk of forced labor in supply chains by improving labor standards and safeguarding workers against abuses, exploitation, and retaliation. In workplaces where unions do not already exist, sectoral or global union federations can serve as critical stakeholders for companies developing risk assessments, mitigation plans, and remedy tools, such as grievance mechanisms across supply chains.

The relatively lower unionization rate in the United States compared to many European countries, coupled with common European practices of industrial relations, should suggest a greater willingness from European governments and private sector actors to engage with trade unions in implementation of the EU FLR. But time will tell. No doubt, global labor union federations representing workers in various sectors across the Global South and North could certainly help strengthen EU FLR implementation efforts by assessing risks and ensuring effective remedies.

Government enforcement must also remain independent and shielded from political influence or undue interference from perpetrators, with safeguards to protect whistleblowers and vulnerable workers. Enforcement authorities must also account for stakeholder power imbalances that make it difficult to document forced labor in many countries worldwide and can undermine effective enforcement.

Civil society and worker organizations also require sustained resources to be able to raise awareness of rights, support credible reporting, and help ensure the law is implemented effectively. Workers, labor organizations, and civil society organizations are often the only trusted actors offering support to victims and workers on raising awareness of rights, gathering documentation, and providing legal advice. Terminated grants previously administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of State sustained nongovernmental organization activities critical for law enforcement, and they also supported partner governments with technical assistance to conduct inspections and compliance activities on the ground. In addition, greater alignment between governments—through shared data, coordinated enforcement, and more consistent standards—would strengthen global efforts to eliminate forced labor and enable training and peer learning on effective practices.

Eliminating forced labor from global supply chains is both achievable and urgent. The EU FLR and U.S. import controls can be mutually reinforcing—but only if enforcement is credible, evidence pathways are workable, and worker voice is integrated into prevention and remediation. If the European Union and United States coordinate implementation and pair trade tools with worker-centered accountability, they have an opportunity to raise expectations across markets and deliver meaningful protections for workers.

Samira Rafaela is a senior adviser (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., a former Member of the European Parliament, and lead negotiator of the EU Forced Labor Regulation. Kelly Fay Rodríguez is the former Special Representative for International Labor Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.